Abstract-This study attempts to quantify the technical and eco nomic benefits to the manufacturing industries involved in CERN con tracts in relation to the expenditures on CERN by its member states. Interviews were carried out in some 130 European firms, which sup plied data on estimates of increased sales and decreased costs due to CERN contracts. This economic utility totals 1665 million Swiss francs (MSF) (up to the year 1978) compared with a sales value to CERN of 394 MSF. Utility/sales ratios range from 0.9 to 7.3 for application fields of cables, magnets, cooling systems, vacuum equipment, electronics, and steel; they are as high as 17.3 for computers and 31.6 for precision mechanics. Some 80 percent of the total reported utility results from sales to markets outside high-energy and nuclear physics, for example, railways, shipbuilding, refrigeration, power generation, and power distribution. For the 877 MSF spent by CFHN in European industry from its overall budget of 3500 MSF during 1955 to 1973, the total utility is estimated to be nearly 5000 MSF. The method and proce dure of analysis and quantification are discussed in detail and some specific cases are presented as examples.
877 MSF in the categories considered in European industry, of which 394 MSF went to the 127 firms in question. Applying the ratios appropriate to each category, the total utility generated by the expenditure of 877 MSF can be estimated to be 4860 MSF. This total is of the same order as the CERN budget of the period 1953 to 1973 for the whole CERN program, i.e., 3500 MSF.
II. AIM OF THE STUDY
One of the main puposes of CERN, in common with simi lar laboratories in the world, is to make available experimental equipment for basic research. In the case of CERN, the re search subject is elementary particle physics, and its equip ment is made available to physicists engaged in this research in all the universities of the member states of CERN.
About 95 percent of CERN's research equipment, much of it involving comparatively advanced technology, is built by industry. It is therefore clear that CERN is to a large extent dependent on the technological standards of its suppliers. Although this is not contested, it has often been asked whether the increasing demands made by CERN on industry do not in turn influence their performance. In other words, do the financial investments which the member states make in CERN to support European universities and produce new results in the field of nuclear particle physics also indirectly bring about technical or economic benefit to the manufacturing industries involved in the CERN contracts and hence to the member States.
CERN is not, of course, the only organization in which this idea has been discussed in recent years. Many other organizations [1] , [2] , often with the aim of helping to justify their budgets, have made similar claims, and some have at tempted to support their claims by quantified studies [3] . In America, in particular, organizations such as NASA [4] , [5] have taken quite elaborate studies, and words have been in vented, such as "fall-out" or "spin-off to describe the effects.
Economists have also been very active in this field, seeking to understand the mechanisms involved, and there is consider able literature on qualitative effects. Unfortunately, none of these studies has yet produced convincing results, and some have discredited the whole idea in the eyes of the public and governments.
In these circumstances it might seem rather rash of CERN to take up this problem, and if a more objective and quantita tive method had not been suggested, which seemed to offer a way of throwing some light on the subject, CERN would cer tainly not have become involved.
The method which was suggested essentially placed the onus of proof and quantification on the industrial beneficiary rather than on the organization, thus avoiding the obvious criticism of studies previously carried out by other organiza tions that the results were invalidated by self interest since the organizations themselves estimated the benefits. Clearly, such criticism could not be leveled at disinterested economists who have also studied the matter. However, so many of these stud ies lacked quantification that no clear relationships emerged.
III. METHOD OF ANALYSIS
The method used is in the general class of economic utility studies, where economic utility is defined as the added value resulting from a production process. Thus the analysis sought to clarify the creation of added value in the economic perfor mance of individual firms as a result of manufacturing con tracts awarded by CERN. The value of the contracts them selves is not taken into account in the analysis, but only the subsequent performance of the firms concerned and subse quent financial benefits which can be directly related to the carrying out of such a contract. The novel feature of this study is that the firms concerned identify the nature of the benefits and estimate their financial value. The role of the investigator in this case is consequently reduced to providing the firms with a list of the kind of benefits which might result, collect ing from the management of the firms the figures which they have estimated, and collating the results.
Generally speaking, the economic utilities in question fall into two groups. On the one hand, there are increases in added value for the firms, due for example, to increased sales, and, on the other hand, cost savings, both related to a CERN contract.
Increases in added value may derive from the following:
1) sales of new products developed and put into production as a result of a CERN contract; 2) increased sales since the quality of the product was im proved to meet CERN specifications; 3) increased sales of existing products due to their use by CERN; 4) sales of new products developed and produced jointly with other firms where the collaboration was due to a CERN contract; 5) market expansion due to a CERN activity subsequently exploited by the firm to increase sales.
In this study, increases in sales are used as an approxima tion to increase in added value. An explanation and justifica tion of this assumption is given in Appendix I. where it is shown that the resulting error should not exceed 20 percent in most cases.
Cost savings due to a CERN contract will include: 1) cost savings in production, either due to the intervention of CERN staff or to expanded markets; 2) cost savings on research and development (R & D) for the firm, due to work done or paid for by CERN; 3) cost savings on capital investment for manufacturing plants, where these costs are partially covered by CERN contracts; 4) cost savings in marketing and promotion, due to using CERN as a reference.
Estimates of increased sales and cost savings are made by the firms themselves after discussions between the manage ment and the investigator. The estimates must be made on a year by year basis, since utilities arise in sequence following the award of a contract. The sequence begins when the second-ary effects of a CERN contract become evident in the opin ion of the firm. It ends when the relationship of these effects can no longer be ascribed to the CERN contract, or when the effects of other contracts or events become predominant. If the end of the sequence is not yet in sight, it is necessary to make an arbitrary time cutoff, which in this study was set at the end of 1978. This year was chosen simply because most of the firms involved plan for 4 to 5 years in advance, but no further.
It should be clear from this brief description of the method that the analysis attempts to compare the actual situation in which the firm has received CERN contracts with a hypothet ical situation in which it did not, and had performed and planned accordingly.
Sales which are made as secondary effects of a firm's contract with CERN are in many cases made to industrial customers who use these products to rationalize their own pro duction or to improve their products. This means that firms which have no contact with CERN at all may gain utility in directly from CERN activities, and these gains have appeared to be quite substantial in the few cases investigated. However, the aim of this study was to quantify utility at the first level, i.e., in those European firms which carried out manufacturing contracts or delivered goods to CERN, and to some degree in their suppliers. Negative effects on competitors of CERN con tractors were not investigated.
IV. PROCEDURE OF ANALYSIS
One of the forseeable difficulties in a study of economic utility is to obtain quantitative information from industry. To solve this problem it was felt that, amongst others, two condi tions had to be fulfilled: precise and relevant questions had to be put to industrial managers and the interviewed persons had to be sufficiently senior to be able to assess all the conse quences of a CERN contract.
To obtain the necessary detailed knowledge about CERN contracts with industry and about the firms involved, as the first step of the study, 110 interviews with CERN staff from the technical divisions were carried out.
Three hundred and forty-five cases, involving 260 firms, where CERN might hrve created utility, were discussed in these interviews. Additional information, such as names of per sons who could be contacted, was collected. Further know ledge about the firms was sought from their reports to share holders and in the short write-ups contained in the Industry Kompass [6] . All this information was filed and served to pre pare the interviews in industry.
The interview in the firm usually followed a fixed pattern. The historical events in the firm's collaboration with CERN were reviewed. Next the person interviewed was asked to des cribe all subsequent effects CERN contracts had caused, fol lowing the list given in the previous section. Whenever a model was necessary to quantify the effects, several models were pro posed by the investigator until agreement could be reached on the model applicable.
From all the interviewed firms, except one, where the responsibile manager could not find the necessary time to study his files to elaborate the figures, the required quantitative in formation was obtained. Some firms have put several man-days of effort into the elaboration of the figures.
V. FOUR EXAMPLES OF CASES AND THE MODELS USED TO QUANTIFY THE UTILITY
Under this heading, four cases out of the 198 investigated in interviews with industry are described. The selection of these four typical cases was made to give some idea of the variety and complexity of the mechanisms leading to economic utility and of the models used for quantification. No case con cerning cost savings was chosen because, where cost savings are concerned, quantification is much more straightforward than in cases where sales were influenced by CERN.
A. A New Product Is Launched Earlier with CERN's Help

1) Historical Events:
During the construction of the inter secting storage rings (ISR), it was decided that it would be pre ferable to make the final precision adjustment and checking of the hundreds of 60-ton magnets in the assembly hall, rather than in the accelerator ring tunnel. Then, of course, the prob lem of transporting them without altering their adjustment had to be solved. Prospection of the transporter market re vealed the existence of a prototype of a hydraulically driven truck which was not yet operational. CERN took the risk of ordering an improved version which, after initial difficulties, carried all the magnets, without damage to their adjustment, to the ISR. The special features of this vehicle are that it starts and stops without jolting and jerking, it keeps its platform hor izontal even when climbing hills with slope up to 8 percent, and it can go sideways.
The owner of the producing firm stated that the CERN contract had advanced the marketing of the truck by at least three years, during which time he had been able to sell a con siderable number, due to the following events.
After World War II, the shipbuilding industry was changing its production process from welding a ship together piece by piece on the dock to préfabrication of sections. These sections were then assembled to make up the ship; the size of the sec tions increased with time (they might weigh over 1000 tons by now), and the handling became increasingly difficult.
The CERN transporter helped the shipbuilding industry to solve one crucial problem, which is lifting up the ship sections and carrying them to storage areas and docks. The transporter works on the basis of a hydraulic drive and it can raise itself by 80 cm. It can be driven under a section which has been con structed on pillars, raise itself to pick up the section, and drive it to any place. Thus investments on overhead cranes or other lifting gear in the welding shops can be saved.
The quantification of secondary effects, in this case on shipbuilding, was outside the frame of this study, and only two shipyards were interviewed. They confirmed that it was extremely unlikely that either one of them would have taken the risk of buying an untried prototype. Once a reference could be given and a model seen at work, many yards ordered this new device.
2) Quantification: To quantify this case a rather simple model was used. Utility is equal to the sales of ship section transporters the firm made between its first sale to CERN and the moment when it would have tried to market the transpor ter on its own, i.e., three years later. This model gives a con servative assessment of the utility, since for several subsequent years actual sales are likely to be higher than those the firm would have made, had they started marketing the transporter only then. The tables could then be sold to high-energy physics lab oratories all over Europe, and possibly to the United States and the Soviet Union as well. This gave the opportunity to some firms to export into what were, for them, new countries. Once they found out the way of doing so, they continued ex porting other goods to these countries. In addition, the firms were able to investigate other applications for this newly ac quired knowledge. Examples of applications marketed are scanning tables to scan the salt contents of human bones in vivo with X-rays and computer-controlled drafting tables. Such drafting tables are used for road building, car-body designing, shipbuilding, etc.
2) Quantification: Whenever a firm decides to exploit the know-how acquired during a contract with CERN and to market a new product, the possession of this know-how repre sents an argument in its decision-making process. Other argu ments may be free production capacity, a corporate strategy to diversify, specific needs of customers detected by market ing, etc. To find the CERN-produced utility, the role that the successful scanning table contract played in the decision to di versify must be assessed. This can also be expressed as the part of the resistance against entering a new business which was re moved by the argument that experience had been gained during the CERN work. After a listing of the arguments, per centage figures can be put to their respective weights. The figure arrived at for the CERN experience multiplied by the se quence of thé sales figures of the new product during its life, gives the CERN-produced utilities. In all cases investigated the firms were able to supply the necessary percentage figures and sales sequences.
C Cern Influences a Firm's Potential to Produce
High-Quality Goods 1) Historical Events: In many cases where CERN ordered complicated, nonstandard material, such as magnets, vacuum chambers, power supplies, etc., CERN imposed a very strict control on the firm, either directly by prescribing the methods or indirectly by the tough specifications defined in the con tract. Quite often this meant that the firm had to learn a new way of controlling quality: management learned a new way of dealing with complex project work in order to satisfy CERN's requirements, quality-control staff acquired know-how, and shop floor workers were trained in new methods and tech niques. As a consequence, after such a CERN contract, a firm is in a position to offer its customers higher quality even on standard products.
2) Quantification: All people who have worked on a CERN contract and then been employed in another job are consiered to be an interface transferring the CERN knowledge into standard production. The contribution of this interface to the firm's quality and the influence of the firm's quality on its sales have to be assessed to quantify the effects.
In detail, the following steps must be taken to calculate CERN's impact on a firm's sales through induced improvement of quality.
a) The sequence of that fraction of the firm's annual turn overs which may be influenced by work done for CERN must be found. b) A percentage figure expressing the management's opinion about the part of the sales which is made as a consequence of the high quality the firm offers its customers must be deter mined. A possible way to get such an assessment is to list the company's nonmonetary assets, for example, agressive sales force, competitive prices, brand image, good relations with governments for obtaining public contracts, leadership in tech nology, flexibility of management, quality of products, etc. Once this list has been established, the management can put percentage figures on every item to indicate its importance.
c) The next step is to rate the contribution the interface made to the company's potential to produce high-quality goods. The staff employed by the firm to achieve the quality are listed (for example, quality control staff, foremen, engineering staff, etc.). The numbers of staff having worked on CERN contracts are counted and expressed as a percentage of the total force. d) Thereafter, the supervisors of the interface staffare asked to express their views on the part of the training that staff re ceived on CERN contracts. The particular values are averaged again giving a percentage figure referring to the total interface.
e) The relative size of the interface may vary over the years. It is then necessary to elaborate all the above-mentioned figures for a given reference year and then apply correction factors for all other years. A rough way to estimate these factors is to find the ratios of CERN sales to that part of the firm's turnover which is influenced by work done for CERN a) and normalize these ratios with respect to the value of the reference year.
The sequence of turnover figures a) is multiplied by the fraction b), indicating the part of the turnover which is made due to the quality of products, by the fraction c), standing for the size of the interface, and by the figure d) showing the CERN share in improving the interface capabilities. Multiply ing the resulting sequence by the corresponding correction fac tors e) gives the annual sequence of utilities attributable to CERN's influence.
D. CERN Blocks a Firm's Research and Development
Capacity for a Period 1) Historical Events: Consumers of electric energy who ch?Jig^ their load very rapidly, such as steel mills, cement mills, and electric railways, pose a constant problem to the power-generating boards. CERN may be counted among these customers, since most of the accelerators are pulsed and ./ould considerably disturb the supply network if they were directly connected. In order to avoid such disturbances, CERN has de voted a continuing effort in collaboration with industry wher ever possible, to developing power supplies to smooth out load peaks. Its first smooth power supply was used for the power separation accelerator, but with the installaion of new accelertors at CERN the specifications for their power supplies became more difficult to fulfill. Development and production of one of these more recent installations took the producing firm two years.
During these two years, the power-generating authorities started to press all their customers to reduce their load peaks. As a consequence, the electric industry began to develop new power supplies to fulfill these requests.
The firm working on the CERN contract had no free devel opment capacity to follow these trends, since the available ca pacity was employed for CERN. The know-how acquired on the CERN work was too sophisticated and the resulting power supplies too expensive to be competitive. Therefore, the firm was about one year behind its competitors when it set out to study simpler solutions. This delay caused smaller sales, for about three years, compared with those the firm could have made had the CERN work not hindered it in following the open market requirements.
During this three-year period electric energy became even scarcer and the electricity-generating authorities wanted even better smoothing of the peak power consumption from their customers. At that moment the firm with the CERN knowhow was in a position to overtake its competitors and sales rose to higher levels than those which would have been possible otherwise.
2) Quantification: This case contains a sequence of negative and positive utility values. The negative utility of the first three years under consideration consists of the difference be tween the actual low sales figures and the hypothetical higher sales figures the firm could have achieved had they been able to follow the market's requirements. In the fourth year, the actual sales became higher than the hypothetical ones, since the firm was able to capitalize on the CERN knowledge. From this year onwards, the utility has a positive sign.
VI. RESULTS
One hundred and forty-five interviews with senior managers representing 134 firms were made between mid-1973 and mid-129 1975. A hundred and ninety-eight cases were discussed during these interviews and quantitative information was obtained to calculate their utility (some firms have spent several man-days of effort to work out the figures). Firms were willing to give the required information even when they had made losses on CERN contracts.
In parenthesis, it seems that the influence of such losses on goodwill has sometimes been overestimated by CERN staff, since some of the firms have tried very hard to get more money from CERN. Once this attempt (in most cases unsuc cessful) was given up, the loss was written off, as is a normal procedure in industry. The get-more-money attempt, however, seems to have impressed CERN people more than the loss did industry.
Only 127 out of the 134 firms interviewed provided data which could be included in the analysis. Of the remaining seven firms, two are in industrial branches which are not being considered, four are not CERN suppliers but benefited from secondary effects, and one could not provide quantitative in formation. Eight firms have not gained any utility so far. The reasons given are the following:
1) There was a lack of production capacity to exploit the acquired know-how. 2) Marketing was unsuited to use the CERN reference suc cessfully .
3) The goods delivered to CERN did not live up to expecta tions. 4) the material delivered to CERN is standard and the CERN reference has no influence on other customers.
The total utility in the remaining 119 firms amounts to 1665 MSF. Only opinions expressed by firms' representatives are taken into account for the calculation of the figure. Losses which firms made on CERN contracts have already been de ducted in this sum.
All utilities before and including 1974 are taken at the cur rency values of the year in which they occured. From 1975 onwards the calculations were made using 1974 prices.
From 1953 to 1973, CERN spent 394 MSF on total pur chases in the 119 firms which reported this utility and the eight firms which have gained no utility so far. This means that 1 SF spent by CERN in the investigated industry had on the average created positive financial consequences of 4.2 SF. Fig. 1 shows a plot of the sequence of the total yearly util ities for the years 1955 to 1978. The graph presents the con tribution of the PS, ISR, BEBC, and SPS projects to the utility. The remaining (white) part represents the utility created by the remaining CERN projects, for instance, MSC, smaller bubble chambers, high-energy physics experiments, and CERNs activities in general (for description of the projects See Appendix IV).
In previous discussions about possible economic secondary effects springing from high-energy physics research, the argu ment was repeatedly advanced that these effects might consist of new technologies and products which could only be used by high-energy physics or nuclear research. Since it was felt to be important to clarify this point, firms were also asked to break down by markets the sales of the products which were af fected by CERN activities. Using this information the utilities were divided and grouped into two categories: utilities made through sales to high-energy physics and nuclear research clients and utilities made through sales to customers who are not involved in this research. Within these two categories the utilities were further broken down into utilities stemming from sales made with in novations stimulated by CERN; utilities achieved through in creased sales of products, due to their use by CERN, due to new collaboration between firms, and due to market expan sion caused by CERN; and cost savings. Table I shows this breakdown of the utilities. As can be seen from the figures, about 82 percent of the utility is related to customers who are not involved in high-energy physics and nuclear research. Indeed, CERN has created utilities which in fluenced areas as remote from its research as the technologies of railways, refrigerators, shipbuilding, hydroelectric power generation, electric-power distribution, control of subways, material storage, car-body designing, oil prospection, televi sion, and many others.
The breakdown of the reported data by industrial category is as follows (see Table II ). 2) Cryogenics and Supraconductivity: The large-scale use of these technologies has not yet come (utility/sales: 1.7).
3) Electronics: CERN has contributed to the advancement of European electronics technology and to the improvement of related components (utility/sales: 4.8).
4) Electric I: Magnets, power supplies, cooling equipment: CERN relies in this field to a large extent on industry's knowhow, in comparison with which improvements due to CERN contracts are lower than average (utility/sales: 2.2). 5) Electric II: RF equipment, cables, condensers: the remark made for Electric I is even more valid for this branch, where CERN purchases, for example cables, are mostly just standard products (utility/sales: 0.9). 6) Precision mechanics: Scanning tables, particle separators, transport equipment, and bubble-chamber components usually represent complex contracts creating considerable know-how and technological potential, which could be used in produc tion of computer-controlled drafting tables, precision parts in nuclear reactors, high-power hydraulic equipment, etc. (util ity/sales: 31.6). 7) Steel production: Magnet steels and welding materials and techniques: low-carbon steels developed for magnets found a large-scale application in the production of small motors as used in washing machines and refrigerators. Utility/ Sales: 7.3. 8) Vacuum: Although CERN has undoubtedly pushed the ultra high vacuum technology and related components a good deal, the vacuum industry's customers are still reluctant to employ the resulting potential because sufficiently convincing arguments cannot be obtained from cost benefit considera tions for replacing conventional vacuum by ultra high vacuum in production. Utility/sales; 3.2.
Within these eight categories two groups of firms are of par ticular interest.
1) The first group consists of those firms situated in Sweden, Norway, Denmark, and Great Britain, which have been helped by CERN to increase considerably their exports into nontraditional markets in other European countries. CERN tries to spread invitations for tenders as widely as possible: A statistical analysis of the data collected in industry and its results backing the above-mentioned relations may be found in Appendix II.
VII. EXTRAPOLATION OF THE INTERVIEW FINDINGS TO THE TOTAL CERN CAPITAL EXPENDITURES IN THE INDUSTRIAL BRANCHES INVESTIGATED
In the years 1955 to 1973, CERN spent 877 MSF in pur chases in the industrial categories investigated in the study, of which 394 MSF went to the 127 firms considered so far. Mul tiplying the total expenditures of all categories with the appro priate utility/sales ratios and adding them up, one arrives at the following estimate of the total CERN-generated utility: 4860 MSF.
The analysis of Appendix II shows that there is a depend-
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enee of the utility/sales ratios on the firms' sizes. One underlying assumption when making the extrapolation is, therefore, that the firms not interviewed have the same size distribution as those covered by the study. The total utilities divided by the amount of total sales (877 MSF) give a utility/sales ratio of 5.5, as opposed to the ratio 4.2 found from the corresponding values in the cases investi gated (see Table II ). This apparent discrepancy stems from the fact that a relatively higher proportion of the sales was inves tigated in industrial categories with lower utility/sales ratios: 67 percent of the sales in the Electric I category with a utility/ sales ratio of 2.2 as opposed to 26 percent in the precision mechanics category (utility/sales 31.6).
The extrapolation has to be analyzed, however, for possible subjective or objective biases before it can be trusted.
A. Biases Introduced since only One Person Carried Chit the !**:rviews
Twenty-eight firms could not provide the figures during the inter ^7'. They elaborated them later and transmitted them in a letter »r telex. In these cases a written document exists, pre pared without the help of the investigator. Interviews were re ported in a written form and discussed in detail with senior CERN staff. Further control was exercised by working groups from Danish and Austrian Universities (see Appendix III). They interviewed a few firms again and arrived at the same results.
B. Selection of Firms
Since its creation, all goods that CERN has bought in Europe in the domains investigated were supplied by approxi mately 340 industrial firms. To obtain preliminary informa tion about these firms, 110 interviews with CERN staff mem bers, chosen more or less uniformly from the technical divi sions, were carried out; 260 firms were mentioned in the inter views and entered in a file. In the beginning of the study, during the first 15 or so interviews in industry, the aim was to show whether or not CERN had actually created quantifiable utility. Therefore 15 firms were chosen using as a criterion the belief, at CERN, that these companies had gained utility. The interviews indeed showed that CERN had produced quantifi able secondary effects, but it also became clear that criteria concerning their volume as, for example, great effort invested by CERN into the advancement of a particular technology, were in themselves no measure for the actually generated utility.
On the contrary, a few cases where the firms were believed to have made nothing but large losses turned out to be very rich in utility. Indeed, the mechanisms necessary for utility creation were mostly unknown at CERN. For this reason, it may be assumed that the 260 firms represent a fairly random sample of the total number of relevant CERN suppliers.
This sample was analyzed to show what percentages of total annual purchases were covered by the companies contained in the file. The analysis revealed that the sample contains rela tively more information about recent years than for the period from 1952 to 1966, with the exception of the PS construction period (1953-1959). This seems to indicate a memory effect: information which is not directly linked with big events, such as memorable projects, has a tendency to get lost, for two reasons: people involved in the work have left the organization and those who have remained have forgotten the details of less remarkable events.
In the selection of firms to be interviewed, the following criteria were applied: there must be at least two firms from each of the member states (except Greece) and a preference was given to those firms which have worked with CERN over at least the past three years. It proved to be difficult for com panies to make quantitative assessments about effects which have just started to show or lie entirely in the future. Outside these two criteria, the selection of the 134 firms out of the 260 contained in the firms file was fairly random by country, sales to CERN, and category.
Obviously, the combined effects of the "memory gap" (less information for the years 1952-1966) and the "older than three years" criterion have as a consequence that the sample of interviewed firms does not represent a constant percentage of CERN's yearly expenditures. A plot of annual CERN pur chases made in the industrial branches investigated, the part of these purchases which was made with the investigated firms, and the percentages that these "investigated purchases" rep resent with respect to the total purchases are shown in Fig. 2 . Utility/sales ratios for firms having worked with CERN twenty years ago are the same as those stemming from more recent collaborations. Thus apparently, no bias was introduced this way of selecting the firms.
To summarize the question of selection bias, the lack of relevant information at CERN made it impossible to enter into the file and later interview only those firms which gained greater than average utility. The two selection criteria applied and the "memory gap" also do not seem to have introduced a bias. Tests applied on the firms not investigated, such as sales to CERN, case distribution by category, and country distribu tion show that the selected firms are a random sample.
C. The Possibility that Industry Exaggerates the Utility
The results obtained from the interviews with managers in industry seem to represent a lower estimate for the utility for the following reasons. 1) All firms know CERN's strict financial and purchasing rules, which prescribe competitive tendering, with the tender lowest in price and offering the required quality being ac cepted. Therefore, it is well understood that mere friendliness, i.e., giving exaggerated utility figures, will not help to get more contracts in the future. Owing to problems which can occur between the parties to a business contract, a few firms were in conflict with CERN at the time of the interview but were still prepared to admit utilities they had gained.
2) Several firms agreed, in principle, that additional utilities were created, but no way could be found yet to quantify them.
3) Some industrial managers had difficulties in admitting that their firm could have learned something from somebody else. evidence from publications, etc., since the firm feared that ad mitted utilities would be used by CERN to negotiate lower prices on the occasion of the next contract.
4) In a few cases the figures provided were obviously too low compared with information given to other CERN staff, or
VIII. REASONS FOR CERN'S PERFORMANCE IN CREATING UTILITIES IN INDUSTRY
A. CERN's Role in the Innovation Process
To classify the ways CERN interacts with industry, it is useful to recall the meaning of the term "innovation. Besides making the above-mentioned attempts to meet high-energy physicists' wishes concerning experimental equip ment, the CERN staff has been building complicated particle accelerators which have to run with high utilization for several decades. Industrial suppliers have found as a consequence that CERN is an excellent test field for products which are either tested before being installed or for which the working duty over many years in the machines corresponds to an extensive test period. Results of tests and working performance even over a long time are communicated to the supplier interested. Often CERN participates in improving components which have failed. In this way it helps industry to perform its development When CERN orders considerable quantities of products containing a fair amount of innovation (magnets, power sup plies, vacuum pumps, etc.), it is not only paying for delivery of goods and the contained technological know-how, but also fi nancing large-scale production facilities, thus laying the basis for further exploitation of the innovation involved. When problems occur during production, which the firm is unable to solve, CERN gives technological help, advising or even delega ting specialized manpower. So the fulfillment of the fourth cri terion (efficient use of outside technology) is sometimes even imposed on a firm.
The second criterion of the Sappho report states that "suc cessful innovators pay much more attention to marketing." Under most circumstances supplying CERN gives the firm an excellent reference, in particular where overseas competition is concerned. In agreement with the findings of the Sappho report, companies having a weak marketing department and not fully exploiting the potential provided by the CERN refer ence, were found to gain smaller utilities than other firms in comparable situations.
One of the troubling aspects of innovation for firms is the possibility of failure. Not being forced to show commercial results, CERN is prepared to take higher risks when trying out new ideas than other customers. Therefore CERN may take a substantial share of the technological risks of an innovation, having considerable "trouble shooting" reserves when problems occur. As a consequence, industry's risks are lowered. Another facet of this risk aspect is that CERN cer tainly takes no competitive advantage from difficulties a supplier may encounter. CERN merely wants high-quality prod ucts in time, for the previously fixed price, and rather than making trouble if problems arise, there are usually CERN staff members giving help at all levels to obtain these results. Table III summarizes CERN's freedom to give contracts to the member and nonmember states without being compelled to observe a quota system means that CERN purchases are based on an objective comparison of price/quality ratios of European and overseas products. If a European producer comes out first in such a comparison he has an excellent tool for removing the market's prejudice about European products. Quite a few firms have used this opportunity successfully, and they have stated that CERN would lose much of its attractiveness if it changed its present purchasing policy to an observation of contract quota with the member states.
In some cases CERN has gone further and contributed to the launching of products which need not fear US competi tion. An example of this is the CAMAC electronics standard, initiated by European nuclear research and high-energy physics laboratories and now sold by European firms in overseas markets.
As to the improvement of management in Europe, CERN has contributed there by stimulating improvements by some of its suppliers in cost calcuation, cost and project control, and quality standards and quality control. At the time CERN was created, some firms had very rudimentary methods of calcu lating the costs of technological products: the costs of the raw materials used were multiplied with experience factors (repre senting necessary manpower and overheads), giving the total price. Having lost money on a fixed-price contract with CERN, more than one firm has very rapidly changed its cost calcula tion and cost control procedures. CERN has forced firms to improve their project control in order to deliver on time. Some companies have introduced PERT on CERN's request. As to the improvement of. quality control, companies were either obliged indirectly by the requirements of a contract to im prove their methods, or they took over devices, prescriptions, or procedures, developed by CERN.
IX. CONCLUSIONS From its creation in 1952 to the end of 1973, CERN re ceived 3500 MSF from its member countries. Out of this, 877 MSF were spent by CERN in those European firms which are considered in this study. These expenditures created an estima ted total utility of 4860 MSF which will be accumulated by the end of 1978.
It is tempting to compare the "input" 3500 MSF with the "output" 4860 MSF and to consider the utility as a return on the 3500 MSF invested into CERN. This is not permissible since the following condition is not fulfilled.
For a return on investment calculation, the total return must be known. This, unfortunately, is not the case, since the result presented quantifies only utilities created in firms which have been in contact with CERN and in some of their sup pliers. Other customers of these CERN contractors have also gained utilities which are not included in the figures when, for instance, they could use the marketed innovations to increase their production efficiency or to improve their products. Cus tomers who buy goods which the selling firm claims are ac cepted by CERN also save money; they benefit because CERN has found out by sometimes costly tests and by comparing more suppliers' goods than most other customers can that a particular product's price/quality ratio is superior to that of its competitors.
Finally, there may be negative effects, which would also have to be considered if the total return was to be calculated; competitors of CERN contractors may have suffered losses in the short run.
However, it may be safely assumed, as a few investigated cases suggest, that the quantitative balance of the effects men tioned above shows a positive sum, but without studying all the effects in some detail, no estimate of its size can be made.
The estimated utility resulting from this study represents, therefore, sales which some European firms would not have made, and cost savings they would not have achieved, had they not dealt with CERN.
The study would have to be extended if it were desired to estimate the positive and negative secondary effects mentioned above; it would also be necessary to compare CERN with other types of investment in science to see whether similar re sults could be obtained in other ways.
A study to determine the utility created by the European Space Agency (ESA) is presently being carried out by the "Bureau d'Etudes Théoriques et Appliquées" (BETA) of the economic faculty of the University of Strasbourg. Approxi mately 50 firms have already been interviewed and the inter mediate results show a pattern comparable to the CERN util ity study. It therefore seems that this method of analyzing secondary effects is generally applicable to "big science" re search centers. The final report of the ESA study will be avail able in the spring of 1978.
Certainly we cannot conclude that the world has become better off economically due to the existance of CERN. In any case this is not CERN's purpose. Research centers like CERN are set up to produce scientific results. Unfortunately, science policy decisions are not only being based on scientific aspects but more and more on economic considerations. In difficult economic situations there is always a certain tendency to cut research budgets because "the weak economy cannot afford economically nonproductive research." Aside from its short sightedness this argument can be questioned in view of the amount of utility created by CERN.
It would be entirely mistaken to make a policy decision on basic science dependent on economic arguments or even to weigh the utility created by research centers against returns on investments into other ventures such as, say, building a road. Science has to be judged on its own merits and by its own standards. But also cutting budgets merely because the eco nomic situation is difficult seems unnecessary since the econ omy profits directly from these spendings.
CERN is a center of high reputation, dedicated to basic re search. It is not that well known however, that CERN has the potential to advance certain technologies related to highenergy physics. One example of this is superconductivity. This is already used in several instruments and even entire accelera tors are planned using superconducting magnets. Their con struction may be very important for the development of super conductors so that they can be used in everyday life. In gen eral, it has been realized that a particular technological field can be advanced more efficiently through financing a demand ing user rather than through open-ended development pro grams. CERN, like other "big science" research centers, is such a user and this should be taken into consideration when partic ular technologies are to be advanced.
APPENDIX I JUSTIFICATION FOR SUBSTITUTING SALES FOR ADDED VALUE IN THIS STUDY AND AN ESTIMATE OF THE RESULTING POSSIBLE ERROR
The values of sales of a particular firm consists by defini tion of the sum of the value added by the firm and the cost of purchased raw materials, semi-finished products, and services. The value added by the firms operating in the industrial branches investigated in this study amounts on an average to 57.5 percent of sales. (This figure was compiled using the rele vant British [9] and German [10] statistics.) This does not, however, mean that the quoted sales figures exaggerate the total utility due to CERN contracts by approximately a factor of two, because the remaining 42.5 percent, covering pur chased raw materials, semi-finished products, and services, con tains in its turn the values added by the suppliers to their pur chases of raw materials.
Ninety-six percent of the reported total utility consists of sales industry could make as a secondary effect of contracts carried out for CERN. To the extent that suppliers of these industries increased their sales of semi-finished products, raw materials, and services, and hence also their added value, the substitution of sales for added value does not introduce an error into the calculations of total utility. This is, however, an assumption, and the utility data represented by sales have to be analyzed in more detail to estimate an upper limit to the re sulting error (See Table IV) .
Whenever the utility created by CERN contributed to the growth of an industry without affecting sales of existing prod ucts and/or helped stimulate purchases in Europe which otherwise would have been made elsewhere, it can be assumed that the suppliers of these industries also increased their added values. This assumption is valid for the following classes of purchases in the above table : B) innovations which do not replace existing products, D) products purchased overseas had not CERN helped European firms to market their material, E) sales made in markets expanded as a result of CERN's activities.
Asuming that in the remaining two cases:
A) innovations which substitute for existing products, C) the use of CERN in the marketing which incited cus tomers to buy from one European supplier rather than from another, the suppliers to the CERN contractors were merely changing the address of their deliveries, the error introduced when sub stituting sales for added values is 11.0 percent (A + C). To this figure the part of raw materials and semi-finished products imported into Europe from overseas has to be added. A detailed investigation carried out by the Viennese study group (see Appendix III) suggests that this part is on an aver- age less than 10 percent of total sales made as utility. Hence the total error, when taking sales instead of added values, has an upper limit of 21 percent. This error is well within the error margin contained in the information from industry, and in particular it is felt that this error is, at least to some extent, offset by utilities which were not reported by industry because the relevant information has in the meantime been lost and by utilities which were admitted in principle but which were im possible to quantify.
APPENDIX II STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF THE REPORTED DATA
In order to gain more insight into the mechanisms of utility generation and to back qualitative impressions gained from in terviews, the data received from industry were analyzed in a multiregression computer program.
An attempt was made to establish dependence of the utility on the following: total sales to CERN; total turnover in 1973 as a measure of its size; industrial category; export policy; the significance of the technological advance which led to the utility. Assuming that the investigated firms represent an unbiased sample of the total family of CERN's suppliers in the indus trial categories considered, the factors mentioned above can also be used to make an estimate of the total utility generated by CERN (a discussion of biases possibly introduced may be found in section VI of this report): I would also like to thank all those CERN staff members who gave me the necessary technological information and contributed so many suggestions.
Last but not least, my grateful thanks go to Dr. C. J. Zilverschoon for his directives, advice, and help at all stages of this study.
